Building on previously proposed methodology for an index of economic and social rights fulfillment, this paper presents country scores and rankings based on the Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index (ESRF Index). Unlike socio-economic indicators, which are often used as proxies for the extent to which rights-holders enjoy economic and social rights, the ESRF Index incorporates the perspective of the duty-bearer as well as the rights-holder, and takes into account the concept of progressive realization. The resulting scores and rankings provide important new information that complements other measures of economic and social rights fulfillement. The ESRF Index is an important conceptual an methodological breakthrough although is still does not capture all key human rights principles, such as the right to non-discrimination and equality. The paper also analyzes the results of the global ranking and outlines some priorities for further research.
Introduction
In a previous paper in this journal (Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer, and Randolph, 2009) , we presented a concept and methodology for a new approach to measuring the level of economic and social rights fulfillment, and proposed a composite index, the Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index (ESRF Index). While the concept of rights fulfillment includes both the right holders' enjoyment of rights as well as the duty bearers' compliance with obligations, measurement of economic and social rights relies increasingly on socio-economic indicators which reflect only one of these perspectives, that of the rights holder. The ESRF Index addresses this weakness and incorporates both perspectives. The Index further takes account of the principle of progressive realization arising from the fact that human rights fulfillment depends in part on state capacity including resources and institutional strengths. This paper presents the results of the ESRF Index for the world --including country scores and rankings --and incorporates several methodological refinements to the original index methodology. It also undertakes an analysis of the results, and suggests priorities for further research. The results show a global pattern of state performance that ranges widely among countries. No country fully meets its obligations for the progressive realization of all economic and social rights, although some countries nearly do so. Other countries fall far short of meeting any of their economic and social rights obligations. The results reveal serious failures even in some very well endowed countries, and find state performance in economic 5 and social rights fulfillment does not depend on income. Our index responds to the often heard concern of human rights advocates that the principle of progressive realization is undefined, thus providing an 'escape hatch' for low income states reluctant to comply with their obligations. The ESRF Index empirically defines the obligations of progressive realization as the maximum achieved globally at the country's level of income, and thus closes the hatch. We will explore the relationship between resources and human rights obligations in a follow up paper.
The results differ substantially from measures that only take into account the rightsbearer perspective, notably the HDI, and demonstrate that the ESRF Index provides significant new information for human rights assessment. The findings highlight the usefulness of the ESRF Index as one among a toolkit of diverse measurement tools that can be used in human rights assessment. While a number of human rights indicators are being proposed, many are qualitative. The central limitation of qualitative measures is comparability but these indicators reveal information on process and structural dimensions. The ESRF Index is highly complementary to these qualitative indicators.
The paper starts with a step by step description of the methodology. The next section presents the scores and rankings. The rest of the paper analyses the findings in three ways: as a description of the state of the economic and social rights fulfillment across countries; in terms of the policy implications; and as an assessment of the ESRF Index as a measurement tool. The final section draws out our conclusions and suggests priorities for further research.
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Methodology
The core Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment Index, ESRF1, (Fukuda-Parr, et al, 2009) takes into account five core economic and social rights: the right to food, education, health, adequate housing, and decent work. A separate index for high income OECD countries, ESRF2, is proposed that uses indicators that are more meaningful in the context of countries with advanced economic and social development. Given data limitations, the ESRF-2 only takes into account four core rights: the right to food, education, health, and decent work. Table 1 shows the specific indicators used to measure enjoyment of particular rights for both our core (ESRF-1) and supplementary (ESRF-2) indices. 1 Our concept and methodology paper , explored several alternative methodologies of calculation for the ESRF Index. In this paper we use the Achievement Possibility Approach specified as Version 2B in that paper. This approach assesses the extent to which a country is meeting its obligation of progressive realization as the percentage of the feasible level of achievement given the country's resources and imposes a penalty on countries with resources sufficient to fully realize a given right but failing to do so.
Review of Achievement Possibilities Frontier Methodology
The Achievement Possibilities Frontier (APF) approach constructs an APF for each indicator that specifies the value of the indicator that can feasibly be achieved at each per capita income level. To do so, first using data from all countries for all years between 1990 and 2006 we plot the scatter of the indicator value, x, against per capita GDP in 2005 PPP$. We then estimate the functional relationship defining the outer envelope of the scatter plot:
x max = f ( y), where x max is a value of x on the outer envelope of the scatter plot. The scatter 7 plots and resultant Achievement Possibilities Frontiers are shown as figures 1-3; figure 1 shows the APFs for those indicators only used in the construction of our core index, ESRF-1, figure 2 shows the APFs for the indictors used in common by ESRF-1 and ESRF-2, while figure 3 shows the APFs used only in the construction of our secondary index, ESRF-2.
[FIGURES 1 THROUGH 3 ABOUT HERE]
The estimated frontiers show for each per capita GDP level the value of the indicator that could be achieved, given the state of knowledge regarding the social-economic policies that best promote economic and social rights. While this "technology" might be expected to change over the long-run, it is expected to be reasonably stable over the short to medium term.
This feature enables valid comparisons over time of the extent to which economic and social rights obligations are being met, a feature essential to evaluating whether the principle of nonretrogression is upheld. Table 2 shows the equations corresponding to each of the Achievement Possibilities Frontiers along with their peak indicator value, Xp, and the income level when the peak indicator value is initially reached, the Yp value. The per capita income level corresponding to the peak indicator value, Yp, differs across indicators as does the shape of the frontiers, reflecting differences in the feasibility of transforming resources into different aspects of rights fulfillment. For example, a primary school completion rate of 100% can be achieved at a per 8 capita income level of $1,076 (2005 PPP) while a per capita income level of $22,190 is necessary to achieve the peak math and science scores on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, reflecting the greater ease of transforming resources into school access than school quality. Three of the indicators for our supplementary indicator, ESRF-2, fail to show any sensitivity to income over the per capita income range concerned: percentage of infants with normal birth weight; percentage of the population with income greater than 50% of median income; and percentage of labor force not long term unemployed. In these cases, the peak value of the indicator, Xp, is set at the highest value achieved by any OECD high income country, and the Yp value is set at $16,000 (2005 PPP), the income level breakpoint differentiating high income countries from upper middle income countries.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Refinements to the Achievement Possibilities Approach
As explained in our previous paper , the ESRF Index is constructed by aggregating indices for each of the separate indicators. Thus the first step is to construct the index for each indicator. The next step is to specify the index value as the percentage of the indicator value that could be achieved, given the country's per capita income level. The third step is to adjust these values for countries with incomes sufficient to realize the maximum indicator value, Xp, but which fail to do so. The index value for these countries is the actual percentage achievement minus a penalty. A number of alternative penalty formulas were explored and compared using an axiomatic approach in our previous paper. Here, we refine our methodology in two regards. First, we adjust the indicator scores to take into account differences between the theoretical and practical minimum indicator values. Second, 9 we utilize a slightly modified version of our preferred penalty formula, formula F, which conforms to ex ante criteria regarding an appropriate penalty.
Although all of the indicators have a minimum theoretical value of zero, the practical minimum value often exceeds zero by a substantial amount, as table 1 shows. For example, the child survival rate never falls below 68% in any country over the 1990 to 2006 period. On the other hand, the observed percentage of births assisted ranges from 5% to 100%. The result is that indicators exhibiting a wider range between their maximum and minimum values inappropriately drive the aggregated index, even if the underlying indicators are explicitly weighted equally. In the above example, the percentage of births assisted drives the health index component of our core indicator if the three health indices are simply averaged. To overcome this bias, we rescale the index value using the following formula: 100 (observed x -minimum value x) / (frontier value x -minimum value x), where the minimum value of indicator x is the minimum observed for any country over the 1990-2006 period and approximates the value one would expect to observe in a failed state with a subsistence per capita income level and no priority given to ensuring economic and social rights. Figure 4 illustrates how the rescaling formula works.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Our previous paper considered seven possible formulas (formulas A-G) to exact a penalty on countries with the resources necessary to realize the maximum value of an indicator, but which fail to do so. Formula F stood out as meeting all the desirable criteria except one, flexibility. As initially specified, it did not include a parameter 10 that can be adjusted to reflect alternative penalty rates. Formula F as initially specified is:
where x is the indicator value (or the rescaled indicator value if rescaling as discussed above), Y/Yp is the ratio of the country's per capita GDP to the per capita income level at which x reaches its maximum value, and x* is the adjusted index value. Note that since the adjustment formula is only applied when Y>Yp, the ratio Y/Yp will always be greater than 1. To remedy the failure of the "Flexibility" criterion, in the above formula, we raise the ratio Y/Yp to the power of β. If β = 1, then the adjustment formula is as specified above. If β>1, then the penalty is increased, while if β<1 it is decreased. The resultant penalty formula is specified below, setting β=.5, our preferred variant of Formula F.
x* 100 . Figure 5 compares the resultant adjusted index values for β= 1 and β=.5 for different values of x. The dark lines show the penalty for β=.5, while the dotted lines show the penalty for β=1. In either case, if the country's score (raw or rescaled) on an indicator is 100% of the peak value of the indicator, its index value is 100% regardless of how high its income becomes.
If a country achieves only 95% of the peak indicator value, as income increases to 10 times the Yp value, the index score falls from 95 to 60% if β=1, but only to 85% if β=.5. If a country achieves only 90% of the peak indicator value, as income increases to 10 times the Yp value its index score falls from 90% to 35% if β=1, but only to 70% if β=.5. If a country achieves only 50% of the peak indicator value, if β=1, the index score decreases to 10% as income increases to 10 times the Yp value, but if β=.5, the index score reaches 0% by the time income increases to 8 times the Yp value. The ESRF scores thus reflect the policy response including both the level of political will and the relative effectiveness of the policies adopted in the context of the external constraints that are faced.
None of the countries for which the ESRF Index can be calculated fully meets its obligations with regard to all five of the rights simultaneously. The best performing country on the ESRF-1 index, Guyana, achieves a score of just over 96%, indicating that it fulfills 96% of its aggregate obligation across all rights; the best performing OECD high income country, Finland, meets just under 95% of its aggregate obligation across all rights.
The contrast across countries is stark. The worst performing country, Equatorial Guinea, only meets 16% of its overall obligation. The results show a large number of countries-rich and poor-falling far short of meeting their economic and social rights obligations. Among non-OECD high income countries, the average of the poorest performing five countries falls at or below 20% of the obligation met on the rights to work, food, and education. Even among the high income OECD countries, the poorest performing 5 high income OECD countries meet only 65% of their obligation with regard to the right to decent work and not quite 75% of their obligation with regard to the right to education. Most countries have the necessary resources to substantially increase the realization of economic and social rights; on average, the 101 14 countries for which the ESRF-1 index can be calculated meet only 72% of their obligation.
Average performance is somewhat better regarding the right to health (78%) and somewhat worse regarding the rights to food and education (both 66%). High income OECD countries do better on average, but still fall substantially short of the mark meeting only 88% of their combined ESR obligations. Like the ESRF-1 countries, they come closest to meeting their obligations with regard to the right to health, (nearly 97%). Unlike the ESRF-1 countries, high income OECD countries' average performance is worst with regard to the right to decent work.
The standardized coefficients from regressions of the ESRF indices on their component rights indicators reveal the right to education is the most important driver of the ESRF-1 Index, while the right to work is the most important driver of the ESRF-2 Index. All of the individual rights indices, however, substantially influence the aggregate index in both the case of ESRF-1 and ESRF-2.
Turning to comparison among different economic and social rights, some rights are fulfilled more consistently than others. Nearly 1 in six countries fully meets its obligations with regard to at least one of four rights, the right to housing, work, food, and education. Although no country fully meets its obligation to provide its citizens and residents with the highest level of health attainable, some nearly do so (maximum ESRF-1 and ESRF-2 right to health scores are 99.95% and 96.99%, respectively). performance rests primarily with the state in question. However, the role of the international community is also an important factor to be considered. Is the donor community providing assistance that is adequate not only in quantity but in quality? Many low income countries with low scores are countries that rely heavily on external cooperation resources which typically finance nearly the totality of the capital investment budget with domestic resources financing only the recurrent expenditures for personnel.
[
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The bottom left panel of figure 8 examines the relationship for high income OECD countries. As both the visual display and the extremely low R-square value reveal, poor performance on the ESRF-2 Index is not linked to per capita income level. Even if one reestimates the relationship after deleting two possible outliers (bottom right panel), the adjusted R-square remains extremely low. The low scores for the lowest ranked high income 16 OECD countries highlight the need for more proactive action by the states concerned; economic growth will not resolve these countries' failure to meet their economic and social rights obligations.
Economic and Social Policies
The ESRF Index results highlight the need to examine a country's overall economic and social policies, rather than just legislative reforms, as necessary measures for the fulfillment of human rights. Economic and social rights obligations cannot be met in the absence of appropriate and effective economic and social policies. While low ESRF scores may be due to lack of legislative measures, such as a constitutional commitment to universal primary education, the implementation of such commitments depends on a wide range of national economic and social policies. These range from budget allocations and sectoral programs to broader policies such as trade and tariff policies that have an impact on employment and incomes. For example, management of patents under the trade agreements relating to intellectual property has important consequences for people who need to access life-saving medicines. Therefore policies regarding trade and intellectual property rights can play a role in helping or hindering the realization of the right to health.
The ESRF Index focuses attention on the state obligations to fulfill human rights, in contrast to much of human rights assessment practice that has focused on obligations to respect. ESRF scores less than 100% reflect shortfalls in fulfillment relative to obligations. Such shortfalls do not only reflect a failure to respect a human right, such as through discriminatory treatment of population groups and individuals. They reflect deficits in economic and social policies of a country to achieve universal fulfillment of a right. For example, low scores on the index could be due to: inadequate public spending; ineffective public policies and programs; historic neglect; and/or external constraints. These failings reflect either a lack of will to give the necessary priority to economic and social rights, ineffective policy choices, or both. While policy choices are primarily a national responsibility, in aid dependent low income countries, donors are also important stakeholders in formulating policy, since they provide much of the financing, and consensus on policy choices as part of the financing agreement. Thus, if economic and social rights obligations are to be met in aid dependent low income countries, donors must give the necessary priority to financing policies that effect their realization.
Methodological Implications
ESRF Index as a Human Rights Measurement Tool
ESRF Index scores differ from other measures of human progress and highlight the distinctiveness of the human rights approach to development. As can be readily seen from figure 8, they differ from GDP per capita which is the conventional measure of progress on which much of economic and social policy formulation relies. They also differ from human outcome measures in health, education, nutrition, housing, and work, and the composite measure of human development, the HDI. As can be seen from the bottom panel of figure 9 , there is no general relationship between the ESRF2 and the HDI. 5 The ESRF index provides different information than the more conventional human outcome measures.
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]
Economic and social rights assessments of countries currently use indicators such as child mortality and school completion as outcome indicators 6 to assess the extent to which 18 countries are meeting specific economic and social rights obligations and the HDI as a summary index of the extent to which countries are meeting their overall obligation. However, the ESRF Index is a more appropriate measure for monitoring purposes and assessment of the effort made by the state to progressively realize economic and social rights to the maximum of their available resources. Countries with very similar HDI scores rank very differently on the ESRF Index. 
Complementarity with Other Indicators
Country assessments should use the ESRF Index together with other relevant information. The ESRF Index focuses on fulfillment rather than on violations, and on quantified human outcomes rather than on processes. It does not capture discrimination, participation, and transparency, all essential aspects of human rights obligations. These aspects have not been integrated into this index because they are difficult to quantify. They are important but better captured in other measurement frameworks being developed and proposed through other initiatives that include 'process' indicators such as participation, and 'structural' indicators such as constitutional guarantees, in addition to human outcome data. housing, and decent work. This can be attributed to good practices in economic and social policy that have emphasized allocation of public funds to the social sectors. However, the country also faces serious lags in its obligations with respect to non-discrimination, particularly in terms of women's enjoyment of equal educational opportunities, as well as refugees' access to decent housing. Disaggregated data on income distribution, education, health, sanitation, poverty, and employment show significant disparities between women and men, rural and urban populations, and refugees and non-refugees. The numbers suggest ongoing discrimination against women and refugees in policy efforts to fulfill economic and social rights.
At the same time however, Education Law (3), adopted in 1994, bars gender discrimination in education. The outcome data on education rights enjoyment therefore contrasts sharply with that on education related structural and institutional guarantees. Moreover, despite strong performances in terms of aggregate outcome measures in the area of the right to health, Jordan's Constitution does not recognize a right to health, and the national health plan does not include an explicit commitment to universal access to health services, so Jordan performs 21 poorly on economic and social rights measures that focus on institutional guarantees (Backman 2008 children. However, to reveal overall neglect of economic and social rights obligations in a country, a summary measure of economic and social rights is needed.
As indicated in our concept and methodology paper, human rights measurement is an emerging field in need of further research. Our earlier paper highlighted the frontier challenges in research and data collection to strengthen measurement methods. The findings from the ESRF estimates highlight the frontier challenges in using the ESRF Index for research on the process of human rights fulfillment, especially the role of different economic and social development policies. In particular, further analysis of ESRF Index results should be pursued to reveal the policy explanations for poor and high performance. For example, a central issue is the role played by budgetary resources and processes, including levels and allocations expenditure allocations, the role of participatory budgeting, and governance factors such as corruption. The ESRF Index is not to be taken as a fixed tool or methodology. The broad approach provides a coherent framework for evaluating economic and social rights fulfillment, but should be continually revised and refined as it becomes applied in assessing the state of 25 human rights fulfillment, and used to hold states to account for national and international policies in promoting economic and social rights fulfillment. 27 1 We refer readers to our previous paper ) for a full discussion of the criteria guiding indicator selection, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the selected indicators.
2 To guard against the use of unreliable data, observations from countries enduring major conflicts within the past ten years were excluded from the frontier plots. Countries enduring major conflicts were identified using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2007) . In addition, because transitional countries' per capita GDP plummeted during the 1990s yet their human capital and the physical infrastructure laid prior to the transition supporting ESR fulfillment did not deteriorate to the same degree, to ensure the AFPs reflect what is reasonably achievable by any country, transitional countries were assigned their pre-transitional per capita GDP until their per capita GDP levels rebounded. See Fukuda-Parr et al. 2009 for further details.
3 Scatter plots of the percentage of babies that are above 2500 grams (that are "normal" birth weight) against per capita income indicate the percentage of normal birth weight babies initially rises with per capita income but subsequently falls with further gains in per capita GDP. The initial rise is likely due to improved nutrition and health care as per capita income rises from low to middle income levels. The subsequent decline is likely due to medical technology enabling premature infants that otherwise would be stillbirths to survive. Because we only use this indicator for high income countries, we set the frontier at the highest value achieved by a high income country as opposed to the highest value achieved by any country. 
